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The IMOs Climate Change Challenge: 
Application of the Principle of Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities 
 




Since 1997 the International Maritime Organization, the 
United Nations agency responsible for the regulation of the 
international shipping sector, has been developing rules for the 
reduction of the sector’s greenhouse gas emissions. Significant 
difficulties have, however, emerged in the creation of appropriate 
economic instruments for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, 
bringing to the forefront the application of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (“CBBDRC”). A key principle within international 
climate change law, CBDDRC allows developing States, least 
developed States and the most environmentally vulnerable to be 
differentially treated based on their special situation and needs. 
Developing States, within the International Maritime 
Organization, rely on this principle in questioning the 
appropriateness of application of uniform international shipping 
standards to the greenhouse economic instruments currently in 
development, viewing this uniformity as economically 
disadvantageous to them. Developed State members, on the other 
hand, maintain the traditional view that all of the Organization’s 
instruments, including those for the reduction of ship-source 
greenhouse gas emissions, must have uniform application to all 
States. This article addresses the difficulties that have arisen in 
creating economic instruments for the reduction of the 
international shipping sector’s greenhouse gas emissions and 
highlights the significant compatibility issues between the work 
of the International Maritime Organization and international 
climate change law. By providing a contemporary analysis of the 
international law principle of CBDDRC and its application to the 
international shipping sector it is argued that the International 
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Maritime Organization cannot currently attain the synthesis 
necessary to effectively apply the CBDDRC principle. The article 
advocates that further work is needed in identifying the legal 
content of the CBDDRC principle and its constituent elements 
that are necessary before States can effectively negotiate the 
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The reduction of levels of greenhouse gases in order to 
stabilize the global climate is one of the greatest environmental 
challenges faced by the international community.1 Increased 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and in 
particular increased carbon dioxide emissions, have led to rising 
global temperatures effecting global weather and climate 
                                                
* Dr Stathis N. Palassis, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
University of Technology Sydney. 
1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 6–9 (2014), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/ (stating that greenhouse gases are primarily 
the carbon dioxide emissions, related to human activities, released into the 
atmosphere, that accelerate the greenhouse effect) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
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patterns.2 The challenge of reducing global greenhouse gas 
concentrations and stabilizing global climate ultimately captures 
all aspects of the energy, industry and transport sectors including 
the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from international 
shipping.3 The international shipping sector plays an integral 
part in international trade; it underpins the global economy and 
is the most cost-effective and environmentally efficient mode of 
transport.4 As international trade increases there will be a 
parallel growth in commercial shipping and ship-source pollution 
will also rise dramatically.5 It is thus necessary that 
international shipping adopt measures to minimize its 
greenhouse gas emissions.6  
Since 1997, the International Maritime Organization 
(“IMO”)7 has been developing rules concerning the reduction of 
the international shipping sector’s greenhouse gas emissions 
within its wider role of reducing all forms of ship-sourced 
                                                
2. See id. (providing a detailed report on current climate change 
research involving causes, and specifically addressing ocean temperatures). 
3. See Air Pollution, Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/ 
PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) 
(estimating that in 2007 the international shipping sector contributed 
approximately 2.7% of the total global carbon dioxide emissions) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
4. See MARINE ENV’T. PROT. COMM. INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS 6 (2010) [hereinafter REDUCTION OF 
GHG EMISSIONS], available at 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Do
cuments/INF-2.pdf (stating that while shipping is the most efficient and 
environmentally sound method for transporting goods, it still creates 
substantial greenhouse gas emissions) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
5. See id. at 6 (predicting growth in shipping capacity due to an 
expanding global economy).  
6. See id. at 1 (describing the need for emissions regulation in a 
growing shipping industry). 
7. See Brief History of IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 
14, 2014) (stating that the IMO is an autonomous specialised agency of the 
United Nations that became active in 1958 with the mission “to promote safe, 
secure, environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through 
cooperation”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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pollution.8 Even though the IMO has successfully regulated other 
ship-sourced air pollutants,9 economic measures for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions and a move towards “low-carbon 
shipping” have proven more difficult.10 In establishing economic-
based instruments a significant rift has emerged within the IMO 
between developed and developing State members.11 At the heart 
of the debate on carbon pricing are complex legal issues 
surrounding the role and responsibility of developing States to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.12 Developing States 
strongly rely on the international law principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(the“CBDRRC principle”),13 thereby questioning the 
appropriateness of uniform international shipping standards, 
which they view as economically disadvantageous.14 
                                                
8. See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 5 
(describing the nine criteria outlined by the secretariat of the IMO for the 
feasibility study directed at developing market based measures to address GHG 
emissions from maritime transport). 
9. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Oil from Ships, Annex VI, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 (amended by Protocol 
Relating to the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil from Ships, 
Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61) [hereinafter MARPOL Convention] (describing 
that the IMO has adopted laws regulating ships’ oxides of nitrogen emissions, 
levels of oxides of sulfur content in fuel , the deliberate emissions of ozone 
depleting substances, and incineration). 
10. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, SOFIA CONFERENCE 
(2012), Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change 6, (2012), available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/4FBED782-B7F9-4195-
9877E671452CBC45 [hereinafter Sofia Conference] (describing the difficulties of 
instituting GHG emissions reform through the legal system following the Kyoto 
agreement) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
11. See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 17–18 
(identifying differences in the economic impact of environmental policies on 
developing and developed countries). 
12. See id. at 18 (noting that developing countries bear a greater 
economic impact when faced with environmental regulation, particularly in the 
shipping context). 
13. See Sofia Conference, supra note 10, at 3 (describing the 
CBDRRC principle in the context of environmental reform). 
14. See Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 276, 301 (2004) 
(identifying why less developed countries rely on common but differentiated 
principles). 
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Developed States on the other hand maintain the position 
of uniform international shipping standards for any economic 
instruments proposed to be adopted.15 The debate is 
demonstrating that there are significant compatibility issues 
between the work of the IMO and international climate change 
law that need to be reconciled.16 It is against this background 
that the present article aims to evaluate the CBDRRC principle’s 
application to the IMO’s economic instruments for the reduction 
greenhouse gas emissions.17 
The article will first, provide a legal analysis of the 
CBDRRC principle;18 and secondly, evaluate the application of 
the CBDRRC principle to the international shipping sector.19 The 
article will demonstrate that the IMO is not currently able to 
synthesise into its work rules international climate change law. 
The IMO ought to first focus on the common responsibility of the 
international shipping sector to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions. States parties can then tackle the separate and more 
difficult stage of differentiated responsibilities. As this article will 
argue, this type of focus will require a negotiation of the legal 
elements of the CBDRRC principle in the forming of a differential 
layer of responsibilities.  
 
II. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
 
A. Identification of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities  
 
The CBDRRC principle has emerged from within the 
contemporary international environmental legal framework and 
is contained in many multilateral environmental instruments 
(“MEAs”).20 It is beyond the scope of the article to outline all 
                                                
15. See id. at 301 (describing that developed states see CBDRRC 
principles as giving less developed states loopholes that make treaties 
ineffective). 
16. See id. at 277 (overviewing the different standards for 
CBDRRC found in treaties, and the difficulties they pose for signatories). 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part II.A. 
19. See infra Part II.B. 
20. See infra notes 32, 34, 36 (describing the recognition of the 
CBDRRC principle in international agreements). 
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instances of the CBDRRC principle’s incorporation into MEAs,21 
and instead will focus on its use within the international law of 
sustainable development and climate change.22  
In 1972 the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm 
Declaration”)23 initially introduced the notion of differentiated 
standards and responsibilities for developing States into 
international environmental lawmaking.24 It provides that:  
 
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed 
upon by the international community, or to 
standards which will have to be determined 
nationally, it will be essential in all cases to 
consider the systems of values prevailing in each 
country, and the extent of the applicability of 
standards which are valid for the most advanced 
countries but which may be inappropriate and of 
unwarranted social cost for the developing 
countries.25 
 
It was not until twenty years later however that States 
met in Rio de Janeiro, from June 3 to June 14th, 1992, for the 
convening of the historic United Nations Conference on 
                                                
21. See infra notes 23, 30, 35, 41 (listing international regimes 
that provide for the CBDRRC principle include those concerning biological 
diversity, desertification, the ozone layer, the law of the sea, and marine 
dumping). 
22. See infra notes 23, 30, 35, 41 (listing international regimes 
that provide for the CBDRRC principle include those concerning biological 
diversity, desertification, the ozone layer, the law of the sea, and marine 
dumping). 
23. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./48/14/REV.1 (June 
16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] (outlining 26 principles for 
environmental protection that were agreed upon by states meeting in Stockholm 
at the landmark U.N. Conference on the Human Environment “UNCHE”) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
24. See id. (declaring that developing states should not be 
economically hindered by environmental action). 
25. Id. princs. 23. 
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Environment and Development (“UNCED”).26 The UNCED was a 
truly landmark event for international environmental law and 
policy because of the extensive adoption of new green principles, 
including the principle of precaution, CBDRRC and polluter 
pays.27 According to Duncan French the CBDRRC principle was 
one of the most “conspicuous aspects” of the UNCED that was 
evident in all the Rio instruments.28 The principle permeated 
through all the Rio initiatives thus providing an inclusionary and 
equitable approach for developing and developed States alike.29 
The CBDRRC principle was incorporated into the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development (“Rio Declaration”),30 Agenda 
21,31 the Statement of Forestry Principles,32 as well as in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
                                                
26. See United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz. June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, 1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 
1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (stating in the preamble, the dates on which 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development met in Rio de 
Janeiro) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
27. See id. princs. 7, 15, 16 (listing provisions of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development).  
28. Duncan French, Developing States and International 
Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities, 49 INT’L 
& COMP. L. Q. 35, 35–36 (2000) (describing that all of the documents produced at 
UNCED included CBDRRC principles). 
29. See id. at 35–36 (listing the documents and the CBDRRC 
principles included in them). 
30. See Rio Declaration, supra note 28, at 1 (declaring as a goal 
the establishment of “a new and equitable global partnership through the 
creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of society and 
people.”). 
31. See United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.151/26 (June 14, 1992) (addressing environmental problems such as 
desertification and forestry loss) (on file with THE WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
32. See United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Non-Legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, 
¶ b, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol III) (June 14, 1992) (identifying 
environmental issues in forestry) (on file with THE WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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(“UNFCCC”),33 the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”),34 
and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 
Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa (“UNCCD”).35 
The provisions of the Rio Declaration significantly 
expanded upon the CBDRRC principle.36 Principle 6 sets the 
scene for developing States by providing that: 
 
The special situation and needs of developing 
countries, particularly the least developed and 
those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be 
given special priority. International actions in the 
field of environment and development should also 
address the interests and needs of all countries.37 
 
Principle 11 provides that uniform standards may be 
inappropriate for developing States: 
 
                                                
33. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (describing this 
was not an easy treaty to negotiate due primarily to three factors: firstly, 
scientific uncertainty over what can be viewed as unsettled climate change 
science; second, the significant economic costs of adopting greenhouse gas 
reduction measures; and third, the CBDRRC over reduction measures between 
developed and developing States) (on file with THE WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
34. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD] (noting that, “special provision is required to 
meet the needs of developing countries, including the provision of new and 
additional financial resources and appropriate access to relevant technologies, 
[n]oting in this regard the special conditions of the least developed countries and 
small island States”) (on file with THE WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
35. See The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly 
in Africa, art. 4(2)(b), June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCCD] 
(stating that the parties shall “give due attention . . . to the situation of affected 
developing country parties with regard to international trade, marketing 
arrangements and debt with a view to establishing an enabling international 
economic environment conducive to the promotion of sustainable 
development.”). 
36. See Rio Declaration, supra note 28, Princ. 6 (giving special 
priority to needs of developing countries).  
37. Id. princ. 6. 
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States shall enact effective environmental 
legislation. Environmental standards, management 
objectives and priorities should reflect the 
environmental and development context to which 
they apply. Standards applied by some countries 
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic 
and social cost to other countries, in particular 
developing countries.38 
 
Principle 7 then provides for differentiated responsibilities 
for developing States: 
 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global 
partnership to conserve, protect and restore the 
health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In 
view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common 
but differentiated responsibilities. The developed 
countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit to sustainable 
development in view of the pressures their societies 
place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they 
command.39 
 
The CBDRRC principle is also contained in the 
international climate change regime that is primarily comprised 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (“Kyoto 
Protocol”).40 The UNFCCC is an aspirational soft law 
instrument.41 Its preamble emphasizes that climate change 
requires a broad-based and effective international response based 
on the CBDRRC principle: 
                                                
38. Id. princ. 11. 
39. Id. princ. 7. 
40. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/CP/1997/C.7/Add1 (Dec. 11, 1997) 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (setting internationally binding emissions reduction 
targets for signatory nations) (on file with THE WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
41. See id. art. 2 (stating that the objective of the treaty is to 
achieve greenhouse gas stabilization).  




Acknowledging that the global nature of climate 
change calls for the widest possible cooperation by 
all countries and their participation in an 
appropriate and effective international response, in 
accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities and 
their social and economic conditions.42 
 
While the treaty may be seen as limited in terms of its 
substantive legal obligations, it is fundamental in terms of its 
creating an institutional framework and thus primarily contains 
strategic and procedural commitments.43 In addition, the treaty 
provides that climate protection needs to occur on the basis of 
generational equity in accordance with the CBDRRC principle 
and with developed States leading climate protection measures. 44  
Article 4 announces a series of commitments that 
commence with a further recognition of the CBDRRC principle.45 
At the same time, the UNFCCC also creates obligations 
specifically for industrialized States that are contained in Annex 
I46 of the treaty.47 Annex I States are required to adopt national 
policies and take measures on the mitigation of climate change, 
                                                
42. UNFCCC, supra note 33, pmbl. 
43. See id. art. 4(1) (coordinating national and international as 
well as governmental and non-governmental efforts to address climate change). 
44. See id. art. 3(1) (“The Parties should protect the climate 
system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly the 
developed country Parties should take lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.”). 
45. See id. art. 4(1) (“All parties, taking into account their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional 
development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall . . . .”). 
46. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Parties & Observers, 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Dec. 14, 
2014) (defining Annex I States as members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) while including economies in transition 
(“EIT”) while Annex II States are OECD member States excluding States that 
are EIT) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
47. See UNFCCC, supra note 33, art. 4(2) (delineating Annex I 
party commitments). 
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by limiting national anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and 
by protecting and enhancing national greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs.48 There is therefore a clear duty solely on Annex I 
States to mitigate climate change.49 
The Kyoto Protocol further reiterates the CBDRRC 
principles.50 The Protocol provides specific obligations for the 
transport sector directing Annex I States to operate through the 
IMO for the reduction of ship-sourced greenhouse gas 
emissions.51 Article 10 then expressly reaffirms that these rules 
need to reflect the CBDRRC principle: 
 
All Parties, taking into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and their specific 
national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circumstances, without introducing 
any new commitments for Parties not included in 
Annex I, but reaffirming existing commitments 
under Article 4 paragraph 1, of the Convention, 
and continuing to advance the implementation of 
these commitments in order to achieve sustainable 
development, taking into account Article 4, 
paragraphs 3, 5 and 7 of the Convention, 
shall . . . .52  
 
The CBDRRC principle is additionally contained in other 
international regimes, including the following that have all 
                                                
48. See id. art. 4(2)(a) (noting further that equitable 
implementation includes “taking into account the differences in these Parties’ 
starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the 
need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, [and] available 
technologies and other individual circumstances.”). 
49. See id. art. 4(2)(a) (“These policies and measures will 
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-
term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the 
Convention . . . .”). 
50. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 40, art. 10 (recognizing 
“common but differentiated responsibilities”). 
51. See id. art. 2(2) (“The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue 
limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the 
International Civil Aviation Authority and the IMO, respectively.”).  
52. Id. art. 10. 
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adopted varying differential approaches to environmental 
responsibilities: the protection of the ozone layer,53 the law of the 
sea,54 and marine dumping.55 
 
B. Evaluation of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
 
The CBDRRC principle is one of the cornerstone principles 
of sustainable development demonstrating that measures must 
differentiate between developed and developing States to reflect 
their economic circumstances and history.56 Despite both the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations being soft law instruments and 
not intended as legally binding, they are important in directing 
                                                
53. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
pmbl., opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, 325 (“Taking into 
account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing 
countries.”); see also Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, pmbl., opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 28, 33 
(“Acknowledging that special provision is required to meet the needs of 
developing countries for these substances.”); Nina E. Bafundo, Compliance with 
the Ozone Treaty: Weak States and the Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 461–95 (2005-2006) (“[CBDRRC] seeks to 
remedy global environmental problems with participation from all corners of the 
world. ‘Common’ suggests that global concerns, like ozone depletion, affect every 
country.”). 
54. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC] (containing numerous provisions 
allowing special treatment for developing States).  
55. See 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature 
Apr. 1, 1997, 36 ILM 1, 1 [hereinafter London Protocol] (recognizing the 
CBDRRC principle).  
56. See Susan Biniaz, Remarks, Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility, 96 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 359–63 (2002) (commenting on the 
types of differentiation and role of CBDRRC); see also Edith Brown Weiss, 
Remarks, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Perspective, 96 AM. 
SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 366–68 (2002) (surveying the “commonness of the 
responsibility, the contextual differences in implementation, and the reflections 
of historical practices and conditions in today's differentiated obligations.”); 
Charles E. Di Leva, Remarks, Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 96 AM. 
SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 363–66 (2002) (considering multiple perspectives of CBDRRC 
and raising questions about its implementation); Christopher Joyner, Remarks, 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 96 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 358-59 
(2002) (discussing the “notion of differentiated responsibility and its 
implications for international law.”). 
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the future development of international environmental law.57 The 
Rio Declaration in particular is a significant international 
instrument in its promotion of a new global partnership requiring 
new dimensions of cooperation amongst States and peoples.58 In 
particular, the Rio Declaration encourages a new basis for 
relationship between wealthy industrialized States and 
developing States in which the benefits and risks are equitably 
shared by all.59 
The CBDRRC principle, as found in numerous MEAs,60 is 
based on a common threshold of responsibility upon which 
differentiated legal obligations are layered.61 Christopher Stone 
notes that “[t]he environment is emerging as the most fertile field 
for nonuniform obligations.”62 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel 
comment: 
 
                                                
57. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Sustainability: Can Law Meet The 
Challenge?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 283, 308 (2011) (“The Stockholm 
Declaration, [and] the Rio Declaration . . . are all soft-law documents that have 
significantly changed how law and legal institutions approach questions of 
sustainability.”); Simon SC Tay, Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge for 
International Environmental Law and Sustainable Development, 11 GEO. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 263 (1999) (“‘[S]oft’s law principles suggest the likely future 
direction of legal development and informally establish acceptable norms of 
behavior for nations.”). 
58. See Marc Pallemaerts, The Future Of Environmental 
Regulation: International Environmental Law In The Age Of Sustainable 
Development: A Critical Assessment Of The Unced Process, 15 J.L. & COM. 623, 
651 (1996) (“The Rio Conference satisfied an important claim of developing 
countries by explicitly recognizing in Principle 7 of the Declaration, that, ‘in 
view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States 
have common but differentiated responsibilities.’”); Rio Declaration, supra note 
30, princ. 7 (“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.”). 
59. See Rio Declaration, supra note 30, princ. 7 (“The developed 
countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international 
pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place 
on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command.”). 
60. See supra notes 23, 30, 35, 41 and accompanying text. 
61. See Stone, supra note 4, at 276–77 (2004) (“‘Common’ suggests 
that certain risks affect and are affected by every nation . . . not all countries 
should contribute equally. [CBDRRC] charges some nations, ordinarily the Rich, 
with carrying a greater share of the burden than others, ordinarily the Poor.”). 
62. Id. at 279. 
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In practical terms, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility has at least two 
consequences. First, it entitles, or may require, all 
concerned states to participate in international 
response measures aimed at addressing 
environmental problems. Secondly, it leads to 
environmental standards which impose differing 
obligations on states. 63 
 
“Differentiated” signifies a special treatment to common 
environmental problems through introducing notions of equity 
into international environmental lawmaking.64 This type of 
equity can be reflected in various ways: exemptions from 
obligations,65 lessened obligations,66 and longer periods of time to 
meet set obligations.67 Introducing such differentiation into 
international environmental law acknowledges the particular 
needs of developing States in creating international rules.68 
Differentiation within an environmental context is certainly 
effective in its attempt to allow these States the right to 
development, a right that has been more extensively enjoyed by 
                                                
63. PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 235 (3rd ed. 2012).  
64. See id. at 233 (“The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility has developed from the application of equity in general 
international law, and the recognition that the special needs of developing 
countries must be taken into account in the development, application and 
interpretation of international environmental law.”). 
65. See id. at 235 (commenting on the UNFCCC’s obligations 
extending only to developed nations). 
66. See id. (identifying “less stringent commitments” as sometimes 
appropriate). 
67. See id. (“Different techniques available to apply [different legal 
obligations] include ‘grace periods.’”). 
68. See id. (finding “express[] recogni[tion]” of “special needs” in 
differentiated responsibility).  
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developed States.69 Application of the CBDRRC principle thus 
also contributes to the attaining of intra-generational equity.70  
According to Lavanya Rajamani, differential treatment is 
both the most effective and the most controversial of the 
techniques available to integrate States from divergent spaces 
into international environmental regimes.71 And in order to 
attain common environmental objectives: 
 
Differential treatment in favour of some may well 
be the pragmatic outcome of a negotiation process 
that seeks to achieve common environmental 
objectives in the face of divergent short-term 
interests and ecological and economic 
interdependence.72  
 
Yet this differentiation between developing and developed 
States may also be over-simplistic in its central meaning. For 
example, not all States fit neatly into the categories of 
“developing” and “developed” and in some cases the distinction 
between developing and developed States may have become 
blurred through application of problematic developmental 
classification criteria.73 
                                                
69. See Shawkat Alam & Md. Saiful Karim, Linkages of 
Development and Environment: In Search of an Integrated Approach through 
Sustainable Development, 23 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 362 (2011) (“Implicit 
in the [CBDRRC] Principle is the recognition that the goal of sustainable 
development cannot be realized through means that deny people . . . their 
individual and collective right to development.”). 
70. See Rio Declaration, supra note 30, para. 3 (providing for 
generational equity such that “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as 
to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations.”). 
71. See LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1 (2006). 
72. Id. at 6. 
73. See Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, 
Geographical Sub-Regions, and Selected Economic and Other Groupings, U.N. 
STATISTICS DIV., (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm (noting that “[t]here is 
no established convention for the designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries or areas in the United Nations system.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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The controversial nature of the CBDRRC principle is 
particularly prominent when examining its application within 
international climate change law where States have already been 
classified as developed or developing. 74 Climate change law 
commences by recognizing the common responsibility that all 
States have concerning the protection of global climate in the 
same way that all States have a common responsibility and 
shared obligations over the protection of the global commons.75 It 
then builds on this common layer by introducing differentiated 
levels of environmental responsibility for developing States 
thereby recognising their special needs while at the same time 
recognizing the fact that developed States have contributed more 
to the demise of global climate.76 It takes into account each 
State’s contribution to climate change as well as their respective 
capacity to remedy the contribution77 and recognises the fact that 
Annex I States created 80 per cent of the current problems of 
climatic change faced.78 It further recognises that developing 
                                                
74. See Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility: 
The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 33–34 
(1999) (noting that during negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol developing countries 
refused to agree to limitations on GHG emissions unless developed countries 
adopted similar emission limitations); Sabrina Safrin, Un-Exceptionalism of US 
Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1307, 1342 (highlighting several 
arguments advanced by developing countries advocating for differentiated 
responsibilities under international environmental law as between developing 
and developed countries); see also Christopher Joyner, Burning Bridges, 
Fuelling Global Discontent: The United States and Rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 27, 49 (2002) (criticizing the Bush 
administration’s failure to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United States 
Senate for ratification). 
75. See Rio Declaration, supra note 30, princ. 2. (describing State 
responsibility “to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”). 
76. See id. princ. 7 (highlighting technology, financial resources, 
and varying pressures placed on the environment as reasons for differing 
responsibilities). 
77. See id. (outlining countries common but differentiated 
responsibilities). 
78.  See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE REGIME (June 19, 2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/climate-
change/global-climate-change-regime/p21831 (acknowledging the Major 
Economics Forum contains countries responsible for 80% of global emissions) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT).  
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States need flexibility in obligation to combat climate change 
thereby ensuring that their economies have the opportunity to 
grow without obligations that would place constraints imposed by 
stringent emission reduction targets.79 Duncan French makes the 
important point that it should not be presumed that developing 
States do not have the potential to cause immense environmental 
damage80 and “that differentiation cannot simply impose 
additional obligations on developed States ad infinitum.”81 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International 
Tribunal has recently considered the CBDRRC principle for the 
Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) in the Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibilities and Obligations in the Area requested by the 
International Seabed Authority (“Seabed Disputes Chamber 
Advisory Opinion”).82 The Chamber had to consider whether 
developing States should have less onerous environmental 
protection obligations than those for developed States.83 On the 
question of ‘preferential treatment’ the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
Advisory Opinion handed down on 1 February 2011 concluded 
“the general provisions concerning the responsibilities and 
liability of the sponsoring State apply equally to all sponsoring 
States, whether developing or developed.”84 According to the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber: 
 
Equality of treatment between developing and 
developed sponsoring States is consistent with the 
need to prevent commercial enterprises based in 
                                                
79.  See id. (highlighting countries like China and the United 
States who were looking for a more flexible option).  
80. See French, supra note 28, at 50 (highlighting the potential of 
developing countries to cause environmental damage). 
81. Id.  
82. See Request for an Advisory Opinion from Nii Allotey Adunton, 
Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, to Judge Tullio 
Treves, President of the Seabed Disputes Chamber (May 11, 2010) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
83. See Responsibilities and Obligations of State Sponsoring 
Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, 
Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 6, ¶ 1, available at 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.
pdf (presenting the issues to be reviewed by the Seabed Disputes Chamber) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
84. Id. ¶ 158. 
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developed States from setting up companies in 
developing States, acquiring their nationality and 
obtaining their sponsorship in the hope of being 
subjected to less burdensome regulations and 
controls. The spread of sponsoring States “of 
convenience” would jeopardize uniform application 
of the highest standards of protection of the marine 
environment, the safe development of activities in 
the Area and protection of the common heritage of 
mankind.85 
 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion is 
however disappointing for its failure to further elaborate on the 
CBDRRC principle. It was a missed opportunity that could have 
provided conceptual discourse and a further elaboration on the 
legal status and substantive composition of the CBDRRC 
principle. The Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion left 
the principle’s meaning, content, legal status and application still 
requiring further analysis. 
The CBDRRC principle is under current consideration by 
the International Law Association (“ILA”).86 In The Legal 
Principles Relating to Climate Change: First Report (2010) (“ILA 
First Report”),87 member Alan Boyle expressed the view that 
after Copenhagen the principle of CBDRRC is arguably “not 
viable.”88 At the same meeting Eric Canal-Forgues expressed the 
view that that emphasis should be placed on the “common 
                                                
85. Id. ¶ 159. 
86. Thus far the International Law Association Committee on the 
Legal Principles relating to Climate Change has completed its fits first two 
meetings: ILA, The Hague Conference (2010); and ILA, Sofia Conference (2012). 
The Committee expects to have completed its work on the ‘Legal Principles 
relating to Climate Change’ and to adopt draft articles and commentaries in its 
Third (and final) Report that will be submitted to the ILA Conference at 
Washington in 2014.  
87. See ILA, The Hague Conference (2010), Legal Principles 
Related to Climate Change First Report, Aug. 15–20, 2010, at 10, [hereinafter 
ILA First Report], available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1029 (continuing previous international 
efforts) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
88. See id. at 10 (highlighting differing views of Committee 
members). 
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responsibilities” which is that part that is “core and realistic,” 
whereas the “but differentiated responsibilities” has more limited 
scope and is more controversial.89 The ILA First Report found 
that the core content of the CBDRRC principle and the nature of 
the obligation entailed to be deeply contested.90 The negotiations 
and literature generate at least two incompatible views on the 
principle’s content.91 One view is that the CBDRRC principle “is 
based on the differences that exist with regard to the level of 
economic development.”92 Alternatively, the CBDRRC principle is 
based on “differing contributions to global environmental 
degradation and not in different levels of development.”93 As to its 
application some view it as obligatory, while others contend a 
discretionary nature.94 Given these divergences the ILA First 
Report concludes that the clear weight of opinion is that the 
principle of CBDRRC has not acquired customary international 
law status.95 
The Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change: Second 
Report (2012) (“Sofia Conference”),96 found that even though the 
CBDRRC principle has not yet attained customary international 
law status it is a principle of considerable legal weight.97 The 
Sofia Conference Report then provides that while some elements 
of the CBDRRC principle may be agreed on others are subject to 
                                                
89. See id. (outlining Eric Canal-Forgues divergent interpretation 
of the CBDRRC). 
90. See id. at 11 (noting the “deeply contested” nature of the 
CBDRRC principles). 
91. See id. (describing two differing views on the content contained 
in CBDRRC principles). 
92. Id. (quoting Bettina Kellersmann, Die gemeinsame, aber 
Differenzierte Verantwortlichkeit von Industriestaaten und 
Entwicklungsländern für den Schutz der gbvlobalen Umwelt 335 (2000) 
(English Summary)). 
93. Id. 
94. See id. (noting a disagreement concerning the nature of the 
obligations inherent in CBDRRC principles).  
95. See id. (determining that CBDRRC principles have not gained 
acceptance as customary international law). 
96. See Sofia Conference, supra note 10. 
97. See id. at 9 (acknowledging the CBDRRC’s “considerable legal 
gravitas.”). 
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debate.98 There is agreement that there is a common 
responsibility on all States to protect the global climate system.99 
There is much less agreement, however, with respect to criteria 
for differentiation: 
 
Stark disagreements remain on whether or not 
historical and per capita emissions are appropriate 
criteria for differentiation. Another contested 
concept is the temporal element, i.e. when should 
major emitters have ‘known’ that their emissions 
were causing harm, and is this relevant to 
determining current and future responsibility and 
obligations? Similarly, it remains controversial 
whether and how commitments of developed 
countries to provide financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries relate to 
CBDRRC . . . Little common ground also exists 
with respect to the need and criteria for graduating 
from differentiation. Differentiation exists where 
relevant differences exist. It follows logically that 
when the relevant differences vanish, 
differentiation should cease, or at least that the 
lack of differences should be taken into account in 
fashioning future obligations under the regime.100 
 
The Sofia Conference also explored complementary 
principles such as prevention and good faith and sought to 
examine how the climate change regime interacts and overlaps 
with other MEAs, in particular those relating ozone depletion, 
transboundary air pollution and biological diversity.101 
Additionally the Sofia Conference sought to examine the 
relationship of the climate change regime with international law 
                                                
98. See id. (noting that divergent opinions concerning CBDRRC 
principles have prevented those principles from becoming customary 
international law). 
99. See id. at 10 (“There is agreement that the protection of the 
climate system is a common responsibility of all parties to the FCCC, developed 
and developing.”). 
100. Id. at 11. 
101. See id. at 32–34 highlighting these as important aspects for 
progress in international climate change law).  
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more generally as it relates to trade, human rights, the law of the 
sea and the protection of world heritage.102  
There is thus yet no clear answer on the evaluation of the 
CBDRRC principle as a legally binding norm of international law 
thereby requiring States to abide by this principle: the customary 
international law status of differentiated responsibilities is 
unsettled.103 This is due largely to the lack of consistency in the 
principle’s practice and the fact that varying uses of the principle 
have been adopted into MEAs. Philippe Cullet, Lavanya 
Rajamani and Christopher Stone and have in no uncertain terms 
expressed the view that custom has not yet crystallized around 
the CBDRRC principle.104 Christopher Stone, in particular, notes 
that “[i]t appears that as the number and reach of multilateral 
treaties has increased, so, too, has the incidence of obligation-
differing agreements. But that falls short of proof that a new 
normative ‘principle’ is in play.”105  
 
III. Application of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities to the International Shipping Sector 
 
                                                
102. See id. at 25–44 (analysing various issues related to 
international law and climate change).  
103. See generally, Stathis Palassis, Beyond the Global Summits: 
Reflecting on the Environmental Principles of Sustainable Development, 22 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41 (2011) (discussing the legality of the Rio 
Declaration’s environmental principles, which were not negotiated as legally 
binding rules but some portions have crystallized as rules of customary 
international law); Daniel B. Magraw, Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: 
Differential, Contextual, and Absolute Norms 1 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
69, (1990) (analyzing the treatment of differentiated responsibilities to realize 
effective solutions to international environmental problems).  
104. See Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International 
Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-State Relations, 10 EURO. J. INT’L L. 
549, 570 (1999) (“The expansion of the international community and the 
globalization often environmental and economic issues have led to the search for 
new legal tools to take into account existing disparities and inequalities among 
states and to foster a better implementation of international agreements.”); 
Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
and the Balance of Commitments under the Climate Regime, 9 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L 120, 124 (2000) (“The legal status of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility in international environmental law 
and, in particular, within the climate regime is subject to dispute.”); Stone, 
supra note 14, at 299 (“[T]he principle is neither universal nor self-evident.”). 
105. Stone, supra note 14, at 300. 
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A. The IMO’s Work on Climate Change 
 
During the last fifteen years the IMO has been developing 
rules for the reduction of the international shipping sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. This reduction is addressed through 
the three main pillars of the IMO’s work: technical measures; 
operational measures; and, market-based measures.106 Major 
progress has been made by the IMO on both technical and 
operational measures.107 Market-based measures have proven 
more difficult however due in large to the inability of the IMO to 
incorporate the CBDRRC principle into its rules.108  
The first of the IMO’s climate change initiatives to reduce 
the international shipping sector’s greenhouse gas emissions was 
a study commissioned as a result of Resolution 8 “CO2 Emissions 
from Ships” adopted at a Diplomatic Conference on Air Pollution 
held in September 1997.109 Resolution 8 required the IMO to 
undertake a study of ship-sourced greenhouse gas emissions as 
part of a global inventory of greenhouse gas emissions.110 The 
Resolution invited the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (“MEPC”) to consider feasible greenhouse gas 
reduction strategies for the international shipping sector.111 The 
result of this was the “Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
                                                
106. See Stathis Palassis, Climate Change and Shipping, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE OCEANS 200 (Robin Warner & Clive Schofield eds., 
2012) (discussing the IMO’s work in the reduction of the international shipping 
sector’s greenhouse gas emissions).  
107.  See IMO, Historical Background on GHG, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pa
ges/Historic%20Background%20GHG.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (providing 
detailed background of the International Martine Organisations work with 
greenhouse gases) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
108.  See id. (stating that the consideration of market-based 
measures had to be postponed).  
109.  See id. (explaining that the resolution “invited the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) to consider what CO2 reduction 
strategies might be feasible in light of the relationship between CO2 and other 
atmospheric and marine pollutants.”). 
110.  See id. (explaining that the resolution required a study of 
“CO2 emissions from ships for the purpose of establishing the amount and 
relative percentage of CO2 emissions from ships”). 
111.  See id. (describing the need for reduction strategies in light of 
the relationship between CO2 and other atmospheric marine pollutants). 
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Ships” that was presented to the 45th session of the MEPC in 
2000.112 
A further Resolution A.963(23) on “IMO Policies and 
Practices related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Ships” was adopted by the twenty-third session of the IMO 
Assembly in December 2003.113 It recognised carbon dioxide as 
the main greenhouse gas emitted by ships and directed that the 
MEPC identify and develop technical, operational and market-
based measures to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from 
international shipping.114 In October 2006 the MEPC adopted a 
work plan for the development of technical and operational 
measures necessary for the reduction of the greenhouse gas 
emissions of international shipping.115 The “Second IMO GHG 
Study 2009” updated the first greenhouse gas study.116 This 
second study addressed the principal greenhouse gases117 and 
other relevant substances,118 and showed that exhaust gas is the 
                                                
112.  See id. (providing a brief history of greenhouse gas regulations 
by the IMO). 
113.  See IMO, IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Res. A.963(23) (Dec. 5, 2003) 
(supporting further regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT).  
114.  See id. at 2 (requesting the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (“MEPC”) develop a greenhouse gas emission index for ships as well 
as guidelines for the application of that index). 
115.  See IMO, Market-Based Measure, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/Pollution 
Prevention/AirPollution/Pages/Market-Based-Measures.aspx (last visited Dec. 
15, 2014) (describing the history of market-based measures as part of a 
comprehensive measure for the regulation of greenhouse gases) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
116. See IMO, Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, Second IMO 
GHG Study 2009, available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=27795&filename=GHGS
tudyFINAL.pdf [hereinafter the Second IMO GHG Study 2009] (analysing 
market based measures to reduce GHG emissions) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
117.  See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Annex A Dec. 10, 1997 (setting out the six 
principal greenhouse gases as: carbon dioxide (“CO2”), methane (“CH4”), nitrous 
oxides (“N2O”), hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”) and 
sulphur hexafluoride (“SF6”)). 
118. See Second IMO GHG Study, supra note 116 (describing other 
relevant substances to include: nitrous oxide (“NOx”), non-methane volatile 
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major source of carbon dioxide/greenhouse gas emissions from 
international shipping.119 The objectives of this study were to 
assess the present and future greenhouse gas emissions from 
international shipping, the potential for reduction of these 
emissions through technology and policy and their impacts on 
climate change.120  
At the sixty-second meeting of the MEPC in July 2011 the 
necessary consensus was reached to make the use of technical 
and operational measures mandatory.121 The rules on technical 
and operational measures are contained in a new Chapter 4 to 
Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention122 that commenced 
operation on January 1, 2013.123 Technical measures are now 
provided for in rules concerning the Energy Efficiency Design 
Index (“EEDI”) a tool that assigns specific energy efficiency to 
new ships.124 Pursuant to Chapter 4 all new ships of 400 gross 
tons and above must be certified with an International Energy 
Efficiency Certificate (“IEE Certificate”) and have an “Attained 
EEDI” (actual verifiable values) which is equal or less to the 
                                                                                                             
organic compounds (“NMVOC”), carbon monoxide (“CO”), particulate matter 
(“PM”) and oxides of sulphur (“SOx”)). 
119.  See id. at 21 (concluding that carbon dioxide is the most 
important GHG emitted by ships).  
120.  See id. at 9 (describing the main objectives of the study).  
121.  See Breakthrough in IMO: Legally Binding Agreement to 
Reduce CO2 Emissions from International Shipping, INT’L MARITIME ORG. 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution 
/Pages/Breakthrought-at-MEPC-62.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (describing 
the adoption, through resolution, MEPC.203 (62) that mandates EEDI and 
SEEMP) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
122. See MARPOL Convention, supra note 9, at 9 (detailing 
regulations on energy efficiency for ships).  
123. See IMO, supra note 121, para. 11 (noting that chapter four, 
however, does allow States to waive compliance with the EEDI requirements for 
a period of up to four years). 
124.  See Lloyd’s Register LR MEPC 62 Agenda Preview, Annex 1 
Prevention of Air Pollution, Including Control of Green House Gas (GHG) 
Emission, (2011) (“[The] EEDI reflects the amount of [CO2] generated per 
tonne/mile . It constitutes a uniform approach to calculation of a ship’s energy 
efficiency during the design and build of new ships and will be used to control 
[CO2] levels emitted for future ships by encouraging improvements in ship 
design.”).  
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“Required EEDI” a base-line calculated per ship category.125 
Operational measures are provided for in rules concerning the 
Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (“EEOI”) as measured 
through the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(“SEEMP”) for ongoing operational management.126 Further, all 
ships are required to be provided with a SEEMP providing for 
procedures necessary to improve the energy efficiency of ships’ 
operations.127 Each ship must keep on board the ship specific 
SEEMP which may form part of the ship’s Safety Management 
System.128 The international shipping sector has now become the 
first international industry sector to adopt a mandatory 
greenhouse gas reduction scheme combating its carbon 
dioxide/greenhouse gas emissions.129 
 
                                                
125. See IMO, Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for 
International Shipping Adopted at IMO Environment Meeting, 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/42-mepc-
ghg.aspx#.VG44PmctCJB (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (stating that the new 
regulations apply to seven classes of ships: bulk carriers; gas tankers; oil, 
chemical and noxious liquid substances tankers; container ships; cargo ships; 
refrigerated cargo carriers; and combination carriers) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
126. See id. (explaining that the adoption and implementation of 
energy efficiency standards through technical and operational measures is 
critical as it establishes the standards for ship design and building, emissions 
measurement, emissions management, operating procedures, and monitoring 
and evaluating mechanisms). 
127.  See Technical and Operational Measures, INT’L MARITIME 
ORG., http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/ 
PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Technical-and-Operational-
Measures.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (listing in detail the SEEMP for all 
ships) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
128.  See id. (outlining potential portions of ships individual safety 
management system).  
129.  See Fiona Harvey, Airlines Agree to Curb Their Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions by 2020, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jun/04/airlines-agree-to-curb-
greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (indicating that it is worth 
noting that on Monday June 3, 2013, the International Air Transport 
Association adopted a resolution calling on States to agree to measures 
regulating the carbon dioxide emissions from air travel to commence operation 
in 2020) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
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B. The IMO and Market-Based Measures 
 
Discussions by the MEPC on market-based measures and 
the adoption of economic instruments have been ongoing since 
2008. Despite the considerable overall progress that has been 
made within the MEPC, consensus on market-based measures 
and the adoption of appropriate economic instruments combating 
the sector’s carbon-dioxide emissions is yet to be reached.130 The 
major difficulty experienced by the MEPC has been the role of the 
CBDRRC principle and its accommodation within the rules of the 
international shipping sector.131 
At the fifty-eighth meeting of the MEPC in 2008, there 
was discussion concerning an emissions trading scheme, a global 
levy on fuel, and other hybrid market-based schemes for ships 
engaged in international trade.132 The majority of delegations, 
however, opposed the development of any market-based measures 
until all the issues surrounding the application of differentiated 
responsibilities had been resolved in the UNFCCC context and in 
full recognition of Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol.133 Other 
delegations expressed the view that as market-based measures 
are a highly complex matter and still at a preliminary stage in 
                                                
130.  See Sophia Conference, supra note 10, at 6 (describing the 
hurdles faced in implementing “clear and binding obligations” to reducing 
greenhouse gasses).  
131.  See infra note 160 (describing the problems the IMO has in 
implementing).  
132.  See Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Marine Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC), 58th Session: 6-10 October 2008, INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Archives/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (“Major progress was made on reducing 
emissions from ships, in achieving safer and more environmentally safer 
recycling of ships, and in facilitating ballast water management.”) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
133.  See id. (“[S]everal other delegations expressed the opinion that, 
given the global mandate of IMO as regards the safety of ships and the 
protection of the marine environment from ship emissions, the IMO regulatory 
framework on the GHG issue should be applicable to all ships, irrespective of 
the flags they fly.”). 
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their development further information and studies were 
needed.134 
The Committee therefore decided to defer a focused debate 
on the matter to its fifty-ninth meeting.135 At the Committee’s 
fifty-ninth meeting in 2009 there was debate as to: first, an offset 
for the growing greenhouse gas emissions from ships and 
incentive for industry investment in fuel and energy efficient 
shipping; and second, the funds generated through market-based 
measures to be utilized for related purposes such as mitigation 
and adaptation activities in developing States.136  
At the sixtieth meeting of the MEPC in 2010, an 
agreement was reached on how to proceed in regards to market-
based measures in which the MEPC Expert Group on Feasibility 
Study and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based 
Measures (“Expert Group”) would consider submitted documents 
and report back to the Committee’s sixty-first meeting.137 The 
Committee noted that it had to develop a methodology of 
feasibility studies and impact assessments to assess the proposed 
mechanisms.138 
                                                
134.  See id. (“Further work on the limitation and reduction of GHGs 
from ships will continue at an intersessional meeting early in 2009, for 
presentation to MEPC 59 in July, which will benefit from the findings of the 
second and final part of the update of the 2000 IMO study.”). 
135.  See id. (“The MEPC also held a discussion on market-based 
measures, and agreed to further discuss such measures at MEPC 59.”). 
136.  See Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Marine Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC), 59th Session: 13-17 July 2009, INT’L MARITIME 
ORG. 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Archives/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (reporting debates and solutions on 
agreements reached and proposals for future debates) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
137.  See id. (“With regard to market-based measures, the 
Committee agreed to establish an Expert Group on the subject to undertake a 
feasibility study and impact assessment of the various proposals submitted for a 
market-based instrument for international maritime transport – again, 
reporting back to MEPC 61.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
138.  See id. (“[The committee] agreed a work plan for further 
consideration, at future meetings, of proposed market-based instruments to 
provide incentives for the shipping industry.”). 
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The Expert Group organized its work within a structure of 
four specialist groups.139 Again, however, some developing States, 
in this instance Brazil, China, Cuba, India and Saudi Arabia, 
advocated for a postponement of any further work on market-
based measures until after the 16th meeting of the conference of 
the parties to the UNFCCC.140 The sixtieth meeting also agreed 
on a methodology that is contained in the Terms of Reference for 
the Expert Group.141  
The sixty-first meeting of the MEPC held extensive debate 
on how to progress on the development of suitable market-based 
measures for international shipping.142 Substantial progress on 
such measures was not, however, expected at this meeting.143 The 
Committee instead discussed the way forward in the adoption of 
market-based measures as well as the comprehensive Report of 
the Expert Group on feasibility and impact assessment of the 
several market-based measures that included eight identified 
proposals.144 The proposed market-based measures considered by 
the Report utilized eight mechanisms for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, comprising both in-sector and out-of-
sector mechanisms.145 The Expert Group, however, found that the 
proposals to varying degrees lacked sufficient detail and that the 
                                                
139.  See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 6. 
(establishing four task groups: environment; shipping and maritime; 
administrative and legal; and trade, development and developing States). 
140. See id. at 16 (outlining the differing opinions related to the 
application of market-base measures).  
141. See id. at 20 (stating that the Terms of Reference include three 
tasks, including scope of feasibility, identification of reduction potential of GHG, 
and third, the study of difference in socioeconomic capabilities between 
developing and developed States). 
142.  See Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Marine Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC), 61st Session: 27 September to 1 October 2010, 
INT’L MARITIME ORG. 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-61st-
Session.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (stating the lengthy debate focused 
around the Expert Group’s findings) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
143.  See id. (discussing the scope of the Expert Group’s work). 
144.  See id. (“[F]ollowing the submission of a comprehensive report 
by an Expert Group, which had carried a feasibility study and impact 
assessment of several possible market-based measures submitted by 
governments and observer organizations.”). 
145. See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 9–10 
(listing mechanisms both in and out of sector).  
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different levels of maturity of the proposals complicated their 
evaluation.146 It concluded that it needed more information on all 
the possible measures that required further elaboration and 
development before being able to make any definitive policy 
assessment.147  
At the sixty-second meeting of the MEPC from July 11 to 
15, 2011, discussion was on the Expert Group’s report and there 
were no major developments regarding the adoption of market-
based measures.148 The MEPC held its sixty-third meeting from 
February 27 to March 2, 2012 and debated at length issues 
arising from the proposed market-based measures.149 The 
Committee also discussed the nine current proposals before the 
MEPC.150 The Committee, however, could not reach consensus on 
a suitable analysis method and thus deferred the establishment 
of terms of reference for the analysis of proposals to MEPC 64.151 
Conclusion also could not be reached on the draft Resolution for 
Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology to developing 
countries following on the MEPC 62 Annex VI amendments and 
                                                
146.  See id. at 19 (“The evaluation was complicated by the different 
levels of maturity of the proposals. Proposals with a high level of maturity 
generated more discussion compared to those that were less developed.”). 
147.  See id. at 19 (“These issues require further policy 
considerations before in order to be more properly addressed.”). 
148.  Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Marine Environmental Protection 
Committee (MEPC), 63rd Session: 27 February to 2 March 2012, INT’L MARITIME 
ORG. http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-
63rd-session.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (“The MEPC continued its 
intensive consideration of proposed market-based measures (“MBMs”), which 
would complement the technical and operational measures already adopted.”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
149. See id. (adopting additional guidelines: Methods of Calculation 
of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (“EEDI”) for new ships; 
Development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (“SEEMP”); Survey 
and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (“EEDI”); and 
calculation of reference lines for use with Energy Efficiency Design Index).  
150.  See id. (“An important series of guidelines to support the 
uniform implementation of mandatory measures to increase energy efficiency 
and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from international shipping 
was adopted . . . paving the way for the regulations to be smoothly and 
uniformly implemented by Administrations and industry.”). 
151.  See id. (“Further debate will continue at the next session 
(MEPC 64, 1 to 5 October 2012).”). 
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this would be further discussed at MEPC 64.152 At the sixty-
fourth meeting of the MEPC from October 1 to 5, 2012, the 
Committee primarily considered additional documentation by 
delegates to the various proposals currently before the 
Committee.153 Due to other pressing matters, however, the 
Committee decided to keep the documents under abeyance and 
postpone further debate on market-based measures to the sixty-
fifth meeting to be held from May 13 to 17, 2013.154 
 
C. The Way Forward on Market-Based Measures 
 
The Expert Group has now provided its comprehensive 
report containing opinion on the compelling need and purpose of 
market-based measures as well as the feasibility and impact 
assessment of the various market-based or carbon price 
measures.155 The scope of the work of the Expert Group was to 
evaluate the current proposals with the aim of assessing the 
extent to which they could reduce the greenhouse gas emissions 
from international shipping while giving priority to the maritime 
sectors of developing States, least-developed States and small-
island developing States.156 
                                                
152.  See id. (“Linked to the implementation of energy efficiency 
measures was the draft MEPC resolution on the Promotion of technical co-
operation and transfer of technology relating to the improvement of energy 
efficiency of ships, where it was agreed to further discuss the draft at the next 
session.”). 
153.  See Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Marine Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC), 64th Session: 1 to 5 October 2012, INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME ORGANIZATION 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-64th-
session.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (“The MEPC received updates to several 
of the proposed market-based measures (MBMs) to reduce GHG emissions, 
which would complement the technical and operational measures already 
adopted.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
154.  See id. (“However, in view of time constraints at the current 
session, the MEPC agreed to postpone detailed debate on MBMs to MEPC 65.”). 
155.  See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 1 (stating 
the purpose of the research and providing background information). 
156.  See id. at 5 (“Consistent with the terms of reference given by 
the Committee, the experts were to evaluate the various proposals with the aim 
of assessing the extent to which they could assist in reducing GHG emissions 
from international shipping.”).  
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There are several proposals on market-based measures 
currently being considered by the Expert Group.157 Whatever 
economic instruments are adopted, such as emissions trading 
schemes or levies, the pricing of carbon will be difficult as the 
IMO needs to incorporate the CBDRRC principle into economic 
instruments combatting its carbon dioxide emissions.158 The 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord 
advocate the interests of developing States and the 
rationalization of the CBDRRC principle thereby placing a 
greater share of greenhouse gas reduction responsibility on 
developed States for current and projected climate effects.159 
This means that the IMO must synthesise into its rules 
the work of the UNFCCC.160 This is an extremely onerous task 
for the IMO for three reasons: first, the IMO needs to integrate 
differential treatment with uniform international standards;161 
secondly, the international climate change regime represents a 
substantial void in international environmental law making;162 
and thirdly the legal content of the CBDRRC principle is yet to be 
identified.163 These difficulties have resulted in a clear inability 
for the IMO to effectively consider the CBDRRC principle.  
On the other hand, uniformity of international shipping 
standards is crucial for the effective management of international 
shipping, which takes a global approach to all matters, including 
                                                
157.  See id. at 6 (stating there are ten proposals describing 
programs with the purpose of lowering GHG emissions from ships).  
158.  See id. at 16 (noting the success of the administrative and legal 
task group in explaining the necessary issues in compatibility with certain 
proposals and existing treaty regimes).  
159.  See id. at 16 (agreeing that CBDRRC principle exists, but 
disagreeing on its application). 
160.  See id. at 37 (stating difficulties in the opposite goals of the 
CBDRRC principles and the IMO’s policy). 
161.  See id. at 37 (“One view is that the UNFCCC provides the 
central policy infrastructure for global climate change action and the proposed 
market-based measures must take into account the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”). 
162.  See ILA First Report, supra note 87, at 3 (“Although these 
instruments are important first steps towards addressing climate change and 
its impacts, they are widely regarded as inadequate and inadequately 
implemented.”). 
163.  See id. at 10 (outlining different theories on how the CDBRRC 
principle applies to international law). 
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pollution regulation.164 Uniformity of international standards is 
supported by the LOSC.165 Part 12 of the LOSC deals with 
pollution and sets out the competence of States over six sources of 
marine pollution including ships-sourced.166 
The LOSC defers details for the technical rules that are to 
be formulated.167 The treaty directs States to operate through the 
competent international organization in reducing all forms of 
ship-sourced marine pollution.168 Even though the IMO is not 
explicitly named, it is beyond doubt that the IMO is such an 
organization.169 
Developing States have challenged the appropriateness of 
the IMO as the competent international organization.170 
Developed States, on the other hand, view the IMO as the forum 
within which to promulgate rules for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions.171 The IMO is generally viewed as the competent 
international organization within which to develop rules for 
international shipping to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions: 
this is supported by the LOSC, the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Copenhagen Accord and Agenda 21. 
Developing States have also questioned whether Annex VI 
of the MARPOL Convention is the correct regulatory strategy, 
                                                
164.  See An Introduction to the IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) 
(“Shipping is a truly international industry, and it can only operate effectively if 
the regulations and standards are themselves agreed, adopted and implemented 
on an international basis. And IMO is the forum at which this process takes 
place.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
165.  See LOSC, supra note 54, at pmbl. (declaring that the purpose 
of the treaty is to settle issues relating to the law of the sea). 
166.  See id. at art. 211 (listing six requirements for states to reduce 
pollution from vessels).  
167.  See id. at art. 211 (“States, acting through the competent 
international organization or general diplomatic conference, shall establish 
international rules.”). 
168.  See id. (directing first that states act through international 
organizations). 
169.  See An Introduction to the IMO, supra note 164 (“[The IMO’s] 
main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is 
fair and effective, universally adopted and universally implemented.”). 
170.  See Palassis, supra note 106, at 14 (questioning current 
strategy and chosen forum).  
171.  See id. at 14–15 (utilizing uniform standards).  
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preferring instead to operate through the auspices of the 
UNFCCC and its conference of the parties mechanism. Developed 
States support the position of the adoption of uniform standards 
within Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention.172 As the IMO is 
the appropriate forum within which to create rules for the 
reduction of ship-sourced greenhouse gas emissions, it follows 
that Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention is the correct 
regulatory instrument.  
As differentiation and uniformity do not sit comfortably 
together, there are significant compatibility issues between the 
work of the IMO in creating market-based measures and the 
work of the UNFCCC that now need to be reconciled.173 The 
application of the CBDRRC principle to a regime based on 
uniformity of international standards will require accommodating 
the interests of both developed and developing States.174 
In creating market-based measures, can developed and 
developing States accommodate each other’s interests or is the 
CBDRRC principle and uniformity of international standards 
mutually exclusive?175 Further, there is no precedent in any of 
the IMO’s 52 multilateral instruments whereby measures have 
been selectively applied to certain ships.176 Quite to the contrary, 
the IMO’s regulatory measures apply to all ships regardless of 
their place of registration, their flag and nationality.177 
Further, a strict application of the CBDRRC principle to 
the international shipping sector would mean that as long as 
ships are registered in developing States and flying a ‘flag of 
convenience’ they would be exempt resulting in considerable 
                                                
172.  See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  
173.  See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 37 
(describing differing views on how to incorporate the CBDRRC framework). 
174.  See id. at 37 (stating that this issue is still being discussed 
among the States). 
175.  See id. at 36 (“Issues related to compatibility of the proposed 
market-based measures and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) are politically difficult and complicated by the 
ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC.”). 
176.  See id. at 36 (stating that the IMO framework is for no 
preferential treatment). 
177.  See id. at 36 (noting that the IMO convention provides for non-
discrimination in IMO instruments). 
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‘carbon leakage’.178 The importance of uniform international 
standards is encapsulated in the IMO’s mission statement:  
 
The mission statement of the IMO as a United 
Nations specialized agency is to promote safe, 
secure, environmentally sound, efficient and 
sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will 
be accomplished by adopting the highest 
practicable standards of maritime safety and 
security, efficiency of navigation and prevention 
and control of pollution from ships, as well as 
through consideration of the related legal matters 
and effective implementation of [the] IMO’s 
instruments with a view to their universal and 
uniform application.179 
 
While there is no precedent in the IMO’s multilateral 
instruments whereby measures are selectively applied to certain 
ships, the UNFCCC Secretariat repeatedly notes that even 
though the IMO has contributed to developing rules in the area, 
it must synthesise its capabilities and expertise along with the 
UNFCCC and be cognisant of the progress under both 
processes.180 Such a synthesis of interests can only occur upon 
and after the identifying of the elements of the CBDRRC 
principle. Only then can the IMO members effectively negotiate a 
legal framework for market-based measures for the international 
shipping sector’s carbon dioxide reduction measures.181 However, 
the accommodation of common but differentiated responsibilities 
within a regime that maintains uniform international shipping 
                                                
178. Allison Crimmins, Carbon Leakage, MIT NEWS ON CAMPUS AND 
AROUND THE WORLD (March 18, 2011), http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2011/carbon-
leakage (defining carbon leakage as the situation that emerges when one carbon 
reduction initiative may result in an increase in emissions elsewhere with an 
overall effect of no real reduction in greenhouse gas emissions) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
179.  See An Introduction to the IMO, supra note 164 (“[The IMO’s] 
main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is 
fair and effective, universally adopted and universally implemented.”).  
180.  See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text. 
181.  See An Introduction to the IMO, supra note 164 (describing the 
IMO as the organization to regulate the international shipping industry). 
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standards can be viewed as a watering-down of the principle.182 
According to Christopher Stone: 
 
The ideal would be to have one set of institutions 
focused on optimal substantive policies and another 
group focused on poverty and development. 
Coupling the ambitions threatens to produce 
suboptimal outcomes for each.183 
 
At the present stage, however, it remains unclear to what 
extent, if any, the CBDRRC principle can be incorporated into the 
IMO’s market-based measures and any economic instruments 




It is imperative that action combatting climatic change not 
be delayed and that measures are taken to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.185 This includes action to combat the carbon dioxide 
emissions of the international shipping sector.186 As has been 
demonstrated, however, there are complex legal issues involved 
concerning the application of the CBDRRC principle whose 
content and status are still uncertain as a norm of customary 
international law. 
Commentators suggest that the CBDRRC principle is not 
yet a legally binding norm of customary international law and 
thus its status, content and application remain unsettled.187 
Despite this commentary, the CBDRRC is a principle of 
                                                
182.  See REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 36 (“The 
proposal could be viewed to be against the principles and provisions of the 
UNFCCC because its Article 4.3 could be viewed as mandating only developed 
country parties to provide funding to mitigation action by developing 
countries.”). 
183.  Stone, supra note 14, at 301. 
184.  See Sophia Conference, supra note 10, at 13 (calling the 
implementation of CBDRRCs a “work in progress”). 
185.  See supra Part I (giving an introduction to shipping in relation 
to emissions). 
186.  See supra Part II (discussing the imperative nature of 
reduction of greenhouse gasses). 
187.  See supra Part II.B (describing the theory of the CBDRRC 
principles).  
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significant gravitas and thus pivotal within international 
environmental law making, particularly as it relates to the global 
commons.188 
Regarding the compatibility of the CBDRRC principle 
with any economic instruments proposed for adoption to the IMO, 
it is concluded that the twin goals of differentiation and 
uniformity do not sit comfortably together.189 These twin goals 
are not merely two conflicting principles of international law; 
they are two central tenets of two distinct multilateral regimes, 
those of the UNFCCC and the IMO respectively.190 
Issues of compatibility are significant and underlie the 
choice of any economic instrument either by way of an emissions 
trading or a carbon levy.191 The issues will not be easy to resolve 
and economic instruments should not hastily be adopted. Further 
work is required before an appropriate model can be adopted. The 
member States of the IMO need to systematically work through 
all compatibility issues and incorporate all relevant rules of 
international law into any proposal on economic instruments that 
is under consideration before any real progress forward can be 
made. 
It is concluded that the IMO focus on the “common 
responsibilities” component and defer further debate on the 
“differentiated responsibilities” component of the principle until 
the ILA has concluded its work and published draft articles and 
commentaries on the components of this difficult and 
controversial international law principle. It is imperative the 
IMO reconciles the two regimes through negotiation of the legal 
elements of the CBDRRC principle; it is critical that the IMO gets 
this right. 
                                                
188.  See id. 
189.  See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text (describing 
the different goals of developing and developed states and how they must 
compromise within a treaty regime).  
190.  See supra notes 188–200 (noting the difficulty in reconciling 
the goals of the IMO with the UNFCC). 
191.  See supra Part III.C (describing the conflicting nature of the 
UNFCCC and the IMO, and how States cannot come to an agreement).  
